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CAN YOU REALLY
BE A GOOD ROLE MODEL TO
YOUR CHILD IF YOU CAN’T BRAID HER HAIR?
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FACTORING
GENDER AND SEXUALITY INTO
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Christina M. Tenuta†
I. INTRODUCTION
The best way to defend your constitutional rights as a parent
may be to enroll in beauty school. One trial court1 implied that the
ability of a parent to style a child’s hair is a relevant consideration
in the determination of a child custody dispute.2 While family
courts make decisions about what traits children should learn from
their parents with respect to gender and sexuality, the constitu-
tional dimensions of these role model arguments remain murky.3
Court decisions that consider the gender and sexuality of the par-
ents and child have threatening constitutional implications. A par-
ent’s ability to be a parent and specifically, style their child’s hair,
has little or nothing to do with the gender and sexuality of the
parent or child. If courts do want to make constitutionally sound
custody determinations based on gender and sexuality, then it
should not be done on such flimsy grounds, such as hair braiding.
Over the past fifty years courts have grappled with how par-
ents’ gender and sexuality affects childhood development and
whether or not it should be considered as a factor in child custody
† City University of New York School of Law, Class of 2010.
1 Many of the cases cited in this article refer to trial court decisions. Although
higher courts later overturned some family court decisions, trial court judges’ opin-
ions provide an insightful glimpse into family court judges’ perspective on gender
and sexuality during child custody determinations.
2 Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 691 (N.D. 1994) (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Through testimony, the court considered the father’s ability to style his child’s hair
because it perceived hairstyling as one of the important traits that parents must pos-
sess as a role model for their children in custody disputes.
3 The father in Dalin appealed the trial court’s custody decision, claiming that the
trial court based its decision on improper gender bias. However, there were no consti-
tutional issues raised. The appeal did not include a constitutional argument, and as
such, the appellate court applied the gender standard but did not discuss its constitu-
tionality. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 687.
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disputes.4 While some courts are now attempting to settle custody
disputes without employing gender and sexuality as determining
factors, not all courts do so. When courts take this liberal ap-
proach, gender and sexuality may still have an effect, even indi-
rectly, on custody determinations. For example, gender had an
implied effect on the custody decision of Roland W. Dalin’s daugh-
ter, after the court asked how he fixed his three year-old daughter’s
hair in the morning.5 Mr. Dalin responded to the judge by saying,
Um, I normally just pull it back and put it in a pony tail. I ha-
ven’t gotten to the point where I can learn how to braid. So I
have my mother assist me in helping her getting her hair
braided. And I comb it. I wash it. And I generally just kind of put
it in a pony tail.6
Was it because he could not braid his daughter’s hair, or show her
how to braid her own hair, that Mr. Dalin lost custody of his daugh-
ter?7 Is he less of a parent for not being able to fix his daughter’s
hair? Is a mother less of a parent if she cannot provide a heterosex-
ual stepparent?
In another example, sexuality was a prominent and explicit
factor in the decision regarding a custody dispute when the court
ruled in favor of the heterosexual father and his new wife.8 The
lesbian mother lost custody because she was not considered a nur-
turing caretaker, even though her partner regularly attended the
child’s field trips and ate lunch with the child at school twice a
month.9 On the other hand, the heterosexual stepmother was con-
sidered an appropriate caretaker, despite the fact that the opinion
does not mention anything about her having shared these same
activities with the child.10
When deciding custody or visitation, judges will sometimes in-
voke a role model argument looking at which parent is better
suited for their child’s psychosexual development.11 Some role
4 See Heidi C. Doerhoff, Assessing the Best Interest of the Child: Missouri Declares that a
Homosexual Parent is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody, 64 MOR. L. REV. 949, 950 (1999).
See also Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State Determination Regarding
Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381 (2005).
5 Dalin, 512 N.W.2d at 691 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (discussing trial court testi-
mony regarding gender).
6 Id. (quoting the father’s testimony at the trial court).
7 Id. (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (discussing trial court testimony regarding
gender).
8 See Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194–96 (Ala. 1998).
9 See id.
10 See id. at 1195.
11 See generally Krotoski v. Krotoski, 454 So. 2d 374, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Weber
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model arguments are gender focused, such as the notion that a boy
needs a strong male role model or a girl needs to learn feminine
activities from her mother.12 Others are sexual, specifically hetero-
sexual: this child needs an opposite-sex parent or parents in a het-
erosexual relationship, as a role model so that the child can
develop as a heterosexual.13 Judges can be both implicit and ex-
plicit in making a role model argument. However, whether based
on gender or sexuality, explicit or implicit, this paper demonstrates
that such determinations are based on outmoded ideas that are
harmful to families. Moreover, while family courts consider the in-
tersection of custody with gender and sexuality, the Supreme Court
has ruled on issues of gender and sexuality. After Craig v. Boren,
states cannot employ traditional gender roles,14 and homosexuality
is protected by the privacy rights of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Lawrence v. Texas.15 This paper explores the effects of Craig v. Boren
and Lawrence v. Texas on custody decisions based on issues of gen-
der and sexuality and argues that these two cases render some cus-
tody decisions unconstitutional. Ideally, family courts should use
the decisions of Craig and Lawrence as a new basis for future atti-
tudes toward gender and sexuality in custody determinations. This
paper argues that judges act unconstitutionally when they make
gendered or heterosexist role model arguments, thus violating
Craig and Lawrence.16
v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 725 (N.D. 1994); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
12 E.g., Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Harris v. Harris,
647 A.2d 309, 312, 314 (Vt. 1994).
13 E.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); S. v. S.,
608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1981).
14 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute [criminalizing
homosexual conduct] furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
16 For the purposes of this paper, I use the terms “gender” and “sexuality” in a
postmodern context, which “understand[s] ‘sexuality’ and ‘gender’ predominantly as
productions of human discourse rather than as natural phenomena.” WILLIAM N. ES-
KRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 584 (2nd ed. 2004). In
particular, when I use the terms “gender” and “sexuality” I use them as they are so-
cially constructed by the legal system, as changing ideological reflections. For exam-
ple, when citing to law and custody cases, I rely on the terms “sex” and “gender” (and
use them somewhat interchangeably) to reflect the gender identity that the court has
assigned to mothers and fathers based on “male” and “female” identities. I use the
term “sexuality” to mean the heterosexual or homosexual orientation of the parent as
described by the court in each particular case. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orienta-
tion” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (1995) (discussing
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In Part II of this paper, I offer a brief history of how courts
have treated sexuality and gender in relation to custody disputes.
Part III describes the role model argument used by courts, based
on which parent’s gender and or sexual orientation is appropriate
for the child’s development. Part IV demonstrates how the role
model argument is unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Craig v. Boren and Lawrence v. Texas. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that gender and sexuality should not be used as a substitute
for evaluating parenting skills in custody cases. The state’s only in-
terest should be supporting safe and healthy sexuality and gender
development for all children and families.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION,
GENDER AND CUSTODY
The concepts of sexuality and gender are often intertwined in
the realm of child custody disputes.17 The gender of the parent or
their child has been raised as an issue by judges in cases of both
same-sex and different-sex families. A major reason for the inter-
mingling of gender and sexuality in child custody disputes is that
child custody laws have traditionally reflected heterosexual assump-
tions and models of parenthood.
The roots of this traditional legal doctrine stem from models
of heterosexual marriage and reflect patriarchal viewpoints of
parenthood.18 In family law, the basis for recognizing individuals as
how the words “sex” and “gender” have, somewhat mistakenly, evolved). Sex refers to
biophysical traits of “men” and “women,” and gender indicates a socially constructed
notion of “male,” “female,” “masculine,” and ‘“feminine.” Nevertheless, this “physi-
cal/social distinction” is often ignored, confused or conflated. Legal doctrine has not
thus far provided for a set definition of “sex” and “gender.”
17 See Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). See also Clifford
J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia,
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 343 (2009) (identifying how common it is for courts in
custody and visitation cases to conflate gender and sexual development stereotypes).
18 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (“No one disputes the appropri-
ateness of Illinois’ concern with the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social
institution of our society.”); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (“While
much study, and even more controversy, continue to center upon the effects of homo-
sexual parenting, the inestimable developmental benefit of a loving home environ-
ment that is anchored by a successful [heterosexual] marriage is undisputed.”);
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684 (Cal. 1977) (“Lest we be misunderstood, how-
ever, we take this occasion to point out that the structure of society itself largely de-
pends upon the institution of marriage.”); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 130 (1992); Nadine A. Gartner, Lesbian
(M)otherhood: Creating an Alternative Model for Settling Child Custody Disputes, 16 LAW &
SEXUALITY REV. 45, 48, 54 (2007).
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parents is the institution of heterosexual marriage.19 For example,
“the law’s emphasis on the formal link and status of parenthood
was essentially secondary to and derived from the formal relation-
ship of marriage.”20 The doctrinal framework of child custody law
began with a patriarchal idea of a father’s absolute rights to the
custody of children based on property rights. Under common law,
a father’s right to ownership and control of his children was analo-
gous to having title, which included the legal duty to support
them.21 Later, courts shifted towards the gender biased standard in
favor of the mother—the tender years doctrine.22 This doctrine
was based on the idea that mother love is natural and better than a
father’s love.23 Following the tender years doctrine24 and in re-
sponse to second-wave feminism,25 courts have now applied a more
gender-neutral custody standard, referred to as the primary care-
taker presumption.26 This standard takes into account factors such
19 In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (“The right of a
natural parent to its child must be included with the bundle of rights associated with
marriage, establishing a home and rearing children.”); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 256–57 (1983)  (“The institution of marriage has played a critical role both in
defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentral-
ized structure of our democratic society.”). Because marriage has played such a cen-
tral role in society, state courts typically favor formal families when determining the best
interests of the child. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“The institution of marriage is of peculiar importance to the people of
the States. It is within the States that they live and vote and rear their children. . . .
The States provide for the stability of their social order, for the good morals of all
their citizens, and for the needs of children from broken homes. The States, there-
fore, have particular interests in the kinds of laws regulating their citizens when they
enter into, maintain, and dissolve marriages.”). Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Sta-
tus of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interest,
MICH. L. REV. 463, 464 (1983) (“The way family relationships are defined has signifi-
cant legal consequences because our laws bestow great benefits upon families.”).
20 Kath O’Donnell, Lesbian and Gay Families: Legal Perspectives, in CHANGING FAMILY
VALUES 77, 86 (Caroline Wright & Gill Jagger eds., 1999).
21 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 76 (1995) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765–1769) 452–53 (1869)).
22 See generally Gartner, supra note 18, at 55.
23 Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916) (“Mother love is a dominant
trait in even the weakest of women, and as a general thing surpasses the paternal
affection for the common offspring, and, moreover, a child needs a mother’s care
even more than a father’s.”). See also ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18.
24 See also Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1981) (noting that tender years
presumption developed from an 1830 case in Maryland where the court reviewed
policy considerations regarding why a child should remain with the mother).
25 See generally Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman,
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 (2004) (discussing second-wave feminism as beginning in the
1960s and 1970s, a movement for women’s rights and liberation that consisted largely
of white, middle-class women).
26 ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18; In re the Marriage of Petersen, 2010
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as which parent feeds, bathes, and grooms the child; it was often
applied with a gender bias that favored the mother.27
WL 4484445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (showing a gender neutral application where Su-
preme Court upheld lower court’s decision to award joint custody to both parents
after determining that the father was the primary caretaker, including pre- and post-
daycare activities, during the marriage). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davis, WL 4493049
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010) (noting that the emotional bond between the child and
the primary caretaker is an important factor to maintain custody arrangement); In re
Marriage of Zigler, 529 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (awarding custody to mother,
who as the primary caretaker was responsible for the child’s health, personal and
educational needs, created a “proper home environment” for the child, and made
day-care arrangements, in contrast to father who had not found a school near his
home for the child).
In establishing which natural or adoptive parent is the primary care-
taker, the trial court shall determine which parent has taken primary
responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following caring
and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals;
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care
of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians;
(5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. trans-
porting to friends’ houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings;
(6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting
child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general
manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social,
etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and
arithmetic.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (describing the application of the
primary caretaker custody doctrine).
27 See, e.g., Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363 (discussing how in some families the father
may perform the role of the primary caretaker, but in traditional families, the mother
did not work “and performed the traditional and honorable role of homemaker”
while the father “played the traditional role of breadwinner, working eight to ten
hours a day,” and updating the tender years doctrine to the newer primary caretaker
doctrine by simply substituting the words “mother” and “maternal” with “primary
caretaker parent”). See also Gartner, supra note 18, at 55 n.10; In re Marriage of Bur-
gess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996) (“Although they saw their father regularly, their
mother was, by parental stipulation and as a factual matter, their primary caretaker.”).
Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla. 1978), illustrates how courts began to take
the role of the primary caretaker into consideration when facing constitutional at-
tacks on the statutory tender years presumption from the father. The custody determi-
nation still favors mothers, where court awarded custody to mother, noting she had
been the primary caretaker of the child since birth:
It is indeed an old notion that a child of tender years needs a mother
more than a father, but defendant has not persuaded us that this notion
is either unsound or unconstitutional. We believe that consideration of
the cultural, psychological and emotional characteristics that are gen-
der related make this custodial preference one of “those instances
where the sex-centered generalization actually (comports) to fact.”
Craig v. Boren, supra, 429 U.S. at 199. The statute’s additional provision
that children who are of an age to require education and preparation
for labor or business should be placed in the father’s custody further
reinforces our decision. This provision makes clear the essential fact
that this statute is not concerned entirely with the “rights” of parents to
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Starting in the 1960’s when courts first began hearing lesbian
and gay custody disputes, courts categorically discriminated against
gay and lesbian parents.28 At the time, a parent’s sexuality was ap-
plied as a per se ban on custody. For example, a California court
ordered a gay father to move out of the home that he shared with
his partner, and “immediately . . . take up residence in the home of
his parents.”29 The court required the paternal grandmother to ac-
company the children during any visitation with their father, and
ordered psychiatric treatment for his homosexual behavior “until
further order of the Court.”30 Thirteen years later, the Supreme
Court of Georgia upheld the trial court’s decision to award custody
of an eight-year-old girl to her paternal grandparents, reasoning
that the mother, who “lived an immoral life,” left her daughter in
the custody of her female friends, who “taught the child about ‘the
gay life.’”31 The per se ban on custody continued well into the
1980’s when the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the father’s
“exposure” of his homosexual relationship to his child rendered
him as “an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.”32
Beginning in the 1970’s, in an effort to transition away from
the outright gender bias of the “primary caretaker presumption”
and sexual orientation discrimination of the per se ban on custody
their children. In addition to, and far beyond, their rights, the para-
mount purpose of the statute is to serve the welfare and best interests of
children.
Id. See also Dodd v. Dodd, 93 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that mother
should be awarded custody of children because she was primary caretaker, was more
sensitive to their needs, and provided a better role model for the children).
28 Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412, 414 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (discussing trial
court’s visitation order that required homosexual father to leave his home that he
shared with his partner to instead reside with his parents and seek psychiatric help);
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (noting that mother’s homosexual-
ity was the overriding factor even though the trial court determined both parents as
“fit, willing and able” to assume custody of the children), overruled by Damron v. Dam-
ron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003). The Supreme Court was concerned that the
mother Sandra would be living with Sue after she admitted to a sexual relationship
with Sue prior to the termination of the marriage. The Court acknowledged that San-
dra’s children would be affected once they become aware of their mother’s homosex-
uality. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d  at 80–81. Commonwealth ex. rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91
A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) (holding that it was proper for the trial court to limit
father’s custody because of his homosexual tendencies and immoral conduct); Collins
v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App., Mar. 30, 1988) (hold-
ing that “[a]fter hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that the lifestyle of the
[m]other was not conducive to the best interests of the child. She therefore awarded
custody to [f]ather”).
29 Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.1.
30 Id.
31 Bennet v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842, 843 (Ga. 1973).
32 Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
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for gay and lesbian parents, courts started to apply “the best inter-
est of the child standard.”33 Currently, the best interest of the child
test consists of various factors, based on state statutes34 and case
law, which are weighed by a judge to determine which parent can
act in the best interest of the child.35 For example, according to the
New York State Court of Appeals, “primary among the circum-
stances to be considered in determining the best interests of the
child are the ability to provide for the child’s emotional and intel-
lectual development, the quality of the home environment and the
parental guidance provided.”36 Thus, courts will include a variety
of factors when crafting their own best interest of the child test.
A parent or child’s sexuality or gender could be considered as
factors among many within the “best interest test,” and given vary-
ing degrees of importance by judges on a case-by-case basis.37 For
example, in Alabama, the child custody statute states that, “the
court may give custody . . . having regard to . . . the age and sex of
the child.”38 However, when sexuality and gender are considered
as factors in custody disputes, judges have relied on harmful myths
about same-sex parents that have produced negative outcomes re-
garding the child’s custody.39 Commonly used arguments against
33 J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1998). This Court applied the “guid-
ing star” legal standard for determining custody disputes—the “best interest of the
children” test. Id. It stated that a homosexual parent is not “ipso facto unfit for cus-
tody,” even though it is permissible for the court to consider a parent’s homosexual
misconduct. Id. In re Marriage of Teepe, 271 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Iowa 1978); ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18.
34 See generally WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(2) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 30-3-1
(1998).
35 See, e.g., Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super Ct. 1992) (“The standard ‘best
interest of the child’ requires us to consider the full panoply of a child’s physical,
emotional, and spiritual well-being.”). See also ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note
18, at 130.
36 Louise E.S. v. W. Stephan S., 477 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (N.Y. 1985).
37 Compare J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“The case law
indicates . . . that homosexual parents’ rights may be restricted if, under the circum-
stances, the imposition of certain restrictions is in the best interests of the children.”),
with In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) The court con-
cluded that a parents’ homosexuality “does not per se provide sufficient basis for a
deprivation of visitation rights.” Id. at 92.
38 ALA. CODE §30-3-1 (1998).
39 See, e.g., J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“Every trial
judge, or for that matter, every appellate judge, knows that the molestation of minor
boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the psychological experts’ testimony indi-
cated.”); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981), overruled by Damron v.
Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003). The Court in Jacobson discussed that, despite
the increased acceptance of homosexuality, homosexuality is still not normal, and thus
it cannot ignore sexuality as a factor. “It is not inconceivable that one day our society
will accept homosexuality as ‘normal.’ Certainly it is more accepted today than it was
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awarding custody to gay and lesbian parents include the fear that
children will be molested by their gay parents,40 develop homosex-
ual preferences,41 suffer psychological harm,42 become infected by
HIV/AIDS,43 or experience harassment and stigmatization for hav-
only a few years ago. We are not prepared to conclude, however, that it is not a signifi-
cant factor to be considered in determining custody of children, at least in the con-
text of the facts of this particular case. Because the trial court has determined that
both parents are ‘fit, willing and able’ to assume custody of the children we believe
the homosexuality of Sandra is the overriding factor.” Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102, 108 (1995) (holding that even though mother’s lesbianism does not per se make
her an unfit parent, “[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a Class 6 fel-
ony in the Commonwealth, Code § 18.2-361; thus, that conduct is another important
consideration in determining custody.”). The trial judge in In re Marriage of Cabal-
quinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) said, “a child should be led in the way of
heterosexual preference, not be tolerant of this thing [homosexuality]” and that “it
can[not] do the boy any good to live in such an environment. It might do some
harm.” The Supreme Court wrote, “[i]n reviewing the entire record before us, we
cannot tell what standards of law the trial court followed in reaching its decision on
visitation rights. While the findings and conclusions of law suggest the homosexuality
of the father was not the determining factor the unfortunate and unnecessary refer-
ences by the trial court to homosexuality generally indicate the contrary.” Id. at 888.
40 J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 867, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying gay fa-
ther custody for fear that his son would be molested by him or his homosexual friends
despite expert psychologist testimony that most sexual molestation occurs among
heterosexuals).
41 S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (expressing concern that the child
“may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the
future.”); J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“The father di-
rectly testified that he thought it would be ‘desirable’ for his child to become a homo-
sexual . . . . The whole tenor of the father’s appeal and his conduct in the trial and
appellate stages demonstrate that he is oriented towards the ‘cause’ of homosexuality.
The trial court could take into consideration the fervor of the father’s beliefs concern-
ing homosexuality in assessing the possibility of harm to the child arising from that
conduct which the trial court characterized as ‘seductive in nature.’”); In re J.S. & C.,
324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (finding persuasive psychologist’s testi-
mony in favor of the heterosexual parent that “the total environment to which the
father exposed the children could impede healthy sexual development in the future
. . . [T]he father’s milieu could engender homosexual fantasies causing confusion
and anxiety which would in turn affect the children’s sexual development . . . . [I]t is
possible that these children upon reaching puberty would be subject to either overt or
covert homosexual seduction which would detrimentally influence their sexual devel-
opment.”); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding
that awarding custody to lesbian mother would harm the child because homosexuality
is a harmful, socially unacceptable, learned practice that will only damage the child’s
future).
42 N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (noting the husband’s
argument that custody modification removing daughter from lesbian mother’s cus-
tody was warranted due to concern that mother’s lesbian relationship would have an
“unwholesome” and “unhealthy” effect upon daughter’s mental health); In re J.S. &
C., 324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (expert psychologist testified that
limiting subject children’s exposure to father’s homosexual lifestyle was considered to
be “good preventative psychiatry”).
43 Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (seeking custody modifi-
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ing gay parents.44
When applying the best interest of the child standard, some
courts strive for a neutral application while other courts still retain
traces of gender-biased notions of child rearing and
homophobia.45 This reality is not surprising, considering that the
best interest of the child standard stems from heterosexual legal
traditions.46 Heterosexual marriage has historically played a central
role in determining legal parenthood doctrines, thereby infusing
child custody doctrine with heterosexism.47
cation because of custodial father’s sexuality and HIV-positive status); J.P. v. P.W., 772
S.W.2d 786, 786–89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (mother sought to supervise child’s visit with
his father to protect child from exposure to AIDS); In re Adoption of Charles B., 50
Ohio St. 3d 88, 95 (1989) (Resnick, J., dissenting) (discussing that child should not be
adopted by a homosexual parent due to the increased risk of contracting HIV). See
also David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Reality, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 345, 361 (1994) (discussing a case where a mother was not
allowed to kiss her daughter for fear of infecting her daughter with AIDS.). See also
Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of
Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257 (2009).
44 Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981), overruled by Damron v.
Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (noting court’s observation that children will “suffer from
the slings and arrows of a disapproving society” when determining custody); Blew v.
Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super Ct. 1992) (overturning trial court decision to limit
lesbian mother’s custody based on other people’s reaction to her sexuality. “The trial
court based a finding of detriment not on the mother’s homosexual relationship itself
but rather on other individuals’ reaction to the mother’s relationship.”); Collins v.
Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (“[S]he
faces a life that requires her to keep the secret of her mother’s lifestyle, or face possi-
ble social ostracism and contempt. This adds tremendous pressure to a young child’s
life.”); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (noting that “the conditions under
which this child must live daily are not only unlawful but also impose an intolerable
burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation attached to them, which will
inevitably afflict her relationships with her peers and with the community at large.”).
45 Compare Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (“In Nicholas’ case, one of life’s realities
is that one of his parents is homosexual . . . . Nicholas’ best interest is served by
exposing him to reality and not fostering in him shame or abhorrence for his
mother’s nontraditional commitment.”), with Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 396
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (noting best interest standard warranted removal of unlimited
visitations with lesbian mother because, “[t]o permit this small child to be subjected
to the type of sexually related behavior that has been carried on in his presence in the
past under the proof in this record could provide nothing but harmful effects on his
life in the future.”). See also ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18, at 130-31.
46 See O’Donnell, supra note 20, at 77.
47 See J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (describing how father
had oral sex regularly with his male partner, in contrast to the “normal” sex he had
with his wife); O’Donnell, supra note 20, at 77 (writing about how the legal notions of
parental rights have been constructed around the institution of heterosexual mar-
riage, O’Donnell expressed “concern about the perceived decline of the family and
urgings to return to ‘family values,’ [which] are firmly based in an ideology of family
life [and] can be described as highly traditional and which revolves around a nuclear
unit based in heterosexual marriage.”). See also Gartner, supra note 18, at 53–54 (not-
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The best interest of the child standard provides judges broad
discretion to determine what type of family structure is most suita-
ble for the child’s development.48 Moreover, judges use their wide
latitude to assert their own homophobic notions49 and gender bias
into the standard.50 The best interest of the child test, therefore,
“often is applied as if it is the best-interest-of-the-state-test, espe-
cially where judges reason that it is in the best interests of a child to
grow up in a conventional state-approved family.”51
The ability of judges to apply the best interest of the child
standard according to their own perceptions of gender is evi-
denced by a 1989 study, conducted by the Massachusetts judiciary
to determine if the best interest of the child standard was applied
with any sort of gender bias from the judge.52 The results from this
study showed that “in 24,000 divorce cases involving child custody
issues, the courts found for the biological mother 93.4% of the
time, the biological father 2.5% of the time and some form of joint
custody 4% of the time.”53 Although this study was conducted
twenty-two years ago, divorcing couples still face the same innate
stigma placed on them by the judicial system, which is further com-
plicated by complex familial constructs.54
ing that when settling child custody cases, courts apply legal doctrines that “stem from
models of heterosexual marriage and embody stark gender biases that do not trans-
late when applied to [homosexual] couples”).
48 J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1998) (“The trial court has broad
powers . . . to impose restrictions and requirements upon visitation for the health and
well-being of the children.”); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (noting that judges possess “wide latitude” when making custody decisions as to
the best interest of the child). See also Wald, supra note 4 at 423.
49 See N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (analogizing
mother’s lesbian partner to social deviants, thereby justifying visitation decree that
protects child from mother’s lesbian partner). In an example of a judge’s tendency to
insert his or her own homophobic notions, one judge analogized mother’s lesbian
partner to a social deviant stating that “[s]uppose the persona non grata were an [sic]
habitual criminal, or a child abuser, or a sexual pervert, or a known drug pusher? To
cut off association with such a person as a condition to the child custody would be
entirely reasonable.” Id. at 183. See also Gartner, supra note 18, at 56.
50 N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183–84, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that
court determined mother is a lesbian based on evidence that she is “servient,” and has
a close friend who has a “powerful, dominant” personality, and does most of the driv-
ing for the two women, further asserting that teenage daughters need a “mother
figure”).
51 ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18, at 130.
52 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Gender Bias Study of the Court System in
Massachusetts (1989), reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745 (1990).
53 Jeffrey A. Dodge, Same-Sex Marriage and Divorce: A Proposal for Child Mediation, 44
FAM. CT. REV. 87, 96–97 (2006) (referring to a study conducted by Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court).
54 Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41–42 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (determining that
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When applied to custody disputes between gay parents, some
applications of the best interest of the child standard included an
inquiry into the “morality” of homosexuality.55 Also considered
were the effects that homophobic reactions from third parties
would have on the child in question.56 Such an analysis further
demonstrates the ability of judges to apply the best interest of the
child standard according to their own ideas of sexuality. Using this
analysis, both lines of inquiry are clearly biased to favor the hetero-
sexual parent.57
Today, courts often apply the best interest of the child as a
balancing test by weighing the parents’ sexuality as one factor
among many in custody hearings such as visitation.58 Even when
courts attempt to balance a parent’s sexuality as one factor among
many in the best interest of the child test, judicial bias often results
in a limitation of parental rights, as was done in the following Mis-
souri Court of Appeals case.59
We are not forbidding the parent from being a homosexual . . . .
We are restricting the parent from exposing these elements of
her ‘alternative life style’. . . . We fail to see how these restric-
tions impose or restrict the parent’s equal protection or privacy
rights, where these restrictions serve the best interest of the
child.60
In this case, the court considered the displays of affection and
sleeping arrangements between the mother and her lesbian part-
ner in order to determine the mother’s visitation rights. The court
found that “[a]ll of these factors present an unhealthy environ-
ment for minor children. Such conduct can never be kept private
enough to be a neutral factor in the development of a child’s val-
ues and character.”61 The court further stated that it “will not ig-
daughter needs mother’s care and advice and son needs male role models); ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW, supra note 18, at 130; Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
supra note 52.
55 In re Marriage of Teepe, 271 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1973) (considering father’s ho-
mosexuality to be “sexual misconduct,” as one factor, among many, in making custody
determination); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
56 Blew, 617 A.2d at 35 (vacating the lower court’s order based in part on the fear
of third-party homophobic reactions).
57 See generally ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 16. Eskridge and Hunter assert that
when an inquiry is made into either the morality of sexual orientation or how third
parties relate to parents’ sexuality, the inquiry is “slanted” in favor of heterosexual
parents, leaving homosexual parents at a disadvantage.
58 S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
59 Id. at 167.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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nore such conduct by a parent which may have an effect on the
children’s moral development.”62 Thus, the court restricted the
mother’s visitations rights because it determined that such factors
had a negative impact on the child.
Many courts still apply the best interest of the child test with a
heterosexual bias, in a way that discriminates against gay parents.
For example, one court rejected a lesbian mother’s suggestion that
a broader best interest of the child standard be used, preferring a
narrower test where homosexuality could never be a neutral factor
in determining the best interest of the child.63 This court ex-
plained its reason for applying a narrow best interest of the child
test by writing, “[s]ince it is our duty to protect the moral growth
and the best interests of the minor children, we find Wife’s argu-
ments lacking. Union, Missouri is a small, conservative community
with a population of about 5,500. Homosexuality is not openly ac-
cepted or widespread.”64
The sex of the child in relation to the sex of the parent can
also be identified as a factor to be considered when courts apply
the best interest of the child test to custody or visitation cases.65
Judges have employed this factor in an implicit and explicit fash-
ion. Implicitly, judges may rely on what they perceive to be com-
monly understood notions of gender and sex;66 or explicitly, when
the parents’ gendered behavior is so outside normative boundaries
that judges feel compelled to identify it as such.67
Explicitly, in Bark v. Bark, an Alabama case, the court began by
stating the elements of the standard that facially incorporate a gen-
der classification: “In making its determination of where the best
interests of a child may lie, the court should be guided by such
factors as the sex and age of the children.”68 The court then goes
on to elaborate on other factors that implicate gender, including,
“the respective home environment of the parties, the characteris-
tics of those seeking custody, and the capacity and interest of each
parent to provide for the varying needs of the children.”69 These
62 Id.
63 S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
64 Id.
65 See Bark v. Bark, 479 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).
66 See N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (wherein an
expert witness asserted that teenage daughters need a “mother figure”).
67 See id. at 186 (restricting mother’s custody because mother was ‘subservient’ to a
close female friend who had a “powerful . . . dominant” personality, and did most of
the driving for the two women).
68 Bark, 479 So. 2d at 43.
69 Id.
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factors were applied in such a way as to operate as a proxy for facial
gender categorization, by favoring a heterosexual father who con-
forms to paternal gender norm stereotypes, and disfavoring the les-
bian mother who does not.70 When applying the best interest of
the child standard, the court looked at the following evidence:
“[T]he mother, besides working, is devoting a great deal of her
time to her female lover, who spends the night with her frequently
. . . . Based on this evidence . . . the trial court could have reasona-
bly concluded that . . . the mother’s primary concern was not her
children but her lover; therefore, the children’s best interest would
be served by placing their custody with their father.”71 This analysis
relies heavily on gender stereotypes of mothers being bottomless
wells of affection and care for their children, and anything less,
especially a diversion that could be identified as sexual, is a cata-
strophic blow to her natural mothering abilities, rendering her un-
natural and unfit to parent. Tellingly, the court here mentions
nothing about the father’s sexuality, whether he does or does not
have a relationship, how much time he devotes to his job or new
partner, or even what kind of parent he is. It says only that when
the “burden” of childrearing “shift[ed]” to the father, he “very will-
ingly assumed the child caring burden and has done an outstand-
ing job.”72 The court leaves the impression that a mother has the
assumed and unquestionable duty of taking care of her children,
and if she dares object, then she will face punishment. For a father,
however, childrearing is a “burden” but one that he must heartily
bear if his ex-wife is a lesbian. Rather than actually relying on
which parent can better meet the child’s developmental needs, or
even striving for a equal division of childrearing responsibilities,
the Bark court begins with the premise that it is the mother’s role
to do so, a job that a woman must do full time, completely absent
of any outside work or sexual interests. And if she cannot meet this
high standard, then the court will punish the mother by awarding
custody of her children to the father.
Often times the distinction between implicit and explicit use
of gender or sexuality is blurred, depending on the particular
judge’s notions and personal beliefs about gender and sexuality.73
In other words, even when judges believe their custody determina-
tions do not employ gender or sexuality as a factor, they are in fact
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 688–89 (N.D. 1994).
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doing just the opposite: making a determination that the child is
better off with one parent due to their gender or sexuality.74 For
example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota offered the follow-
ing as a defense of the court’s judgment that the father who could
not braid his daughter’s hair was better off with her mother:
Gender bias in judicial proceedings is wholly unacceptable . . . .
We agree that if the trial court assumed that fathers, as a group,
are incapable of adequately raising their daughters, it would be
relying on an improper factor to determine custody . . . . How-
ever, we do not believe the above exchange evidences that the
trial court based its custody determination on the misguided,
stereotypical assumption that daughters require female
caregivers . . . [t]he trial court merely followed up Roland’s at-
torney’s inquiry as to who did the cooking and Roland’s disclo-
sure that he relied on his mother for tasks such as potty training
and hair braiding . . . Under the circumstances, we conclude
that the trial court’s questions were not motivated by or evi-
dence of gender bias.75
As courts have become more aware of issues of sexuality in particu-
lar, some courts have adopted the “nexus test.”76 The “nexus test”
is an attempt at a more neutral approach to the application of the
parent’s sexuality as a factor in the best interest of the child test in
custody disputes.77 In some jurisdictions judges look for a nexus
between the parent’s sexual orientation and the harm to the child
when weighing a parent’s sexuality as a factor.78 The nexus test re-
74 See id.
75 Id. at 689.
76 See Constant A. v. Paul C. A., 496 A.2d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for the use of the nexus test, whereas the majority adopted the
best interest of the child standard). Judge Beck wrote:
I would hold that a parent’s homosexuality is a relevant consideration if
it can be shown that the parent’s homosexual behavior adversely affects
the child(ren). In order for homosexuality to be relevant there must be
a clear factual showing of a connection between the parent’s homosexu-
ality and its adverse effect on the well-being of the child(ren). Id. (Beck,
J., dissenting).
77 See Delong v. Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *11 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan 20, 1998).
(“[A]n irrefutable presumption, where a parent’s homosexual conduct is, alone, de-
terminative, is inherently inconsistent with the best interests of the child standard. . . .
Accordingly, a nexus approach is adopted in custody cases involving the issue of a
parent’s sexual conduct.”).
78 See id. See also, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 284–85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (rejecting the per se approach to determining parental unfitness, but neverthe-
less finding a nexus between a lesbian mother’s homosexual conduct and adverse
effects on the ‘morality’ and ‘well-being’ of her children.); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256,
1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (noting lack of evidence that a lesbian mother’s
homosexuality would adversely affect her daughters.); Wald, supra note 4, at 427.
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quires the court to find a relationship between parental sexuality
and harm to the child.79 “Under the ‘true’ nexus approach, the
burden of persuasion is allocated so that there must be proof that
parental sexuality will have an adverse impact on the child.”80 How-
ever, despite the more evenhanded intent of the nexus test, some
courts still find it appropriate to apply the test in such a way that
requires the homosexual parents to prove an absence of harm to
the children.81 For example, judges often consider factors such as
whether the gay parent is “discreet” versus “flamboyant” when mak-
ing custody determinations between heterosexual and homosexual
parents.82
While the nexus test is based on the best interest of the child
standard and considers homosexuality as only a factor, it is not the
sole factor in awarding custody unless the homosexual conduct of
the parent harms the child.83 The homosexual orientation of a par-
ent is not by itself evidence that the parent is unfit.84 Sexual orien-
tation can also be considered as a secondary factor by a court even
if there is a statute that establishes a list of primary factors (not
including sexuality) to be considered in awarding custody, because
all factors need to be considered.85
Courts have explained and applied the nexus test thusly:
79 S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985).
80 Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who are Queer: Look-
ing at Sexual Minority Rights From a Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REV. 916, 919 (2001).
81 See Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *12 (R 10.9(a)(ii) (ordering trial court to apply
the nexus test and determine what effect, if any, mother’s homosexuality has on chil-
dren”). See also, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513–14 (Ark. Ct. App.
1987) (adopting nexus test with the presumption that “illicit sexual conduct on the
part of the custodial parent is detrimental to the children” and determining that “ho-
mosexuality is generally socially unacceptable”); McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117
(Idaho 2004) (noting that court applied nexus test); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d
281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding the application of the nexus test); Robson, Our
Children, supra note 80, at 919.
82 M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (granting custody to a
gay father on the ground that the “father’s behavior has been discreet, not flamboy-
ant.”); Clifford R. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender
of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 270 (2009).
83 Pryor v. Pryor, 709 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (relying on precedent
to hold that “sexual orientation as a single parental characteristic is not sufficient to
render that parent unfit to retain physical custody of a child”); Paul C. v. Tracy C., 622
N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (App. Div. 1994) (citing state case law to hold that “[w]here a par-
ent’s sexual preference does not adversely affect the children, such preference is not
determinative in a child custody dispute”).
84 Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a
“discreet homosexual relationship” is not a per se bar to custody of a child).
85 Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that sexual acts are interpreted as sexual misconduct, but that adverse effects or dam-
age by reason of the sexual acts must be shown to justify a change in custody).
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[I]ndiscreet behavior, such as living with someone of the oppo-
site sex without the benefit of marriage, is only a factor to be
considered, and our case law requires that there be evidence
presented showing that such misconduct is detrimental to the
child. . . . Such misconduct is not evidence in itself of a substan-
tial detrimental effect on a child despite the absence of any
proof of harm to the child.86
Even when finding that homosexuality by itself cannot be a basis
for custody modification, one court has found that it was a valid
concern of the heterosexual mother’s that the father was insensi-
tive when communicating with his daughters about his sexuality.87
Here, the trial court judge held that the father’s decision to
“openly co-habit[ate]” with his male partner should be communi-
cated in an appropriate manner because it will spark questions
from the children and their friends, and be an issue in the “con-
servative culture and morays (sic) in which the children live. Father
has shown some insensitivity to the girls’ needs regarding his lifes-
tyle, even contrary to the recommendations of the Court-ap-
pointed evaluator.”88 While the Supreme Court of Idaho went on
to clarify that it was not basing a change in custody on the father’s
sexuality, it nevertheless acknowledged that how a parent com-
municates their homosexuality to their children was relevant for
custody determinations.89 The Court even went so far as to say the
mother’s request that a professional counselor assist both parents
in explaining the father’s homosexuality was reasonable.90 Even
though the court believed it did not use homosexuality alone as a
basis for modifying custody, it clearly placed great weight on the
father’s sexuality, stating that,
[w]hile we acknowledge that homosexuality is a sensitive issue
and that a parent may feel he or she has a valid concern about
the way in which the other parent communicates this to their
children; whether or not a parent’s sexual orientation will, in
and of itself, support a change in custody of the children is a
different issue altogether.91
It is doubtful, that it is a “different issue altogether” though, when
there is no mention of whether the mother’s lifestyle required ap-
propriate explanation to the children, or required the assistance of
86 Jones v. Haraway, 537 So. 2d 946, 947 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
87 McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004).
88 Id. at 117.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 118.
91 Id. at 117.
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a professional counselor. One might argue that all divorcing
couples would do well to employ the assistance of a professional
when explaining the new divorce arrangement to their children, or
when introducing new partners into the children’s lives. However,
the court reserved that special standard only for the homosexual
parent, indicating that the father’s sexuality did in fact have some
bearing on the court’s custody determination.92
Key to the application of the nexus test is the requirement that
parents show how the other parent’s sexuality will have a harmful
effect on the child.93 Appellate courts sometimes differ from trial
courts in their evaluation of the evidence offered to show such
harm.94 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed a Court of Civil
Appeals application of the nexus test, after the trial court found
that there was no evidence indicating that a mother’s lesbian rela-
tionship had a detrimental effect upon the child.95 The Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the trial court’s application of the
nexus test, which, after hearing evidence from counselors that the
child “touch[ed] herself ‘excessively’ in the genital area . . . might
have issues of anger and sexuality” and might be the victim of sex-
ual abuse (a suspicion stemming from the father’s concern over
the mother’s sexuality), granted the father’s motion to change cus-
tody.96 The Supreme Court also found the testimony from the
child’s appointed guardian ad litem to be persuasive: “studies sug-
gest that a child reared by homosexual parents could suffer exclu-
sion, isolation, a drop in school grades, and other problems.”97
The Supreme Court granted custody to the father because, even
though evidence showed the mother loved the child, “she has cho-
sen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that is ‘neither
legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most its citizens.’”98
Instead, the Court favored the father and stepmother, because they
“have established a two-parent home environment where hetero-
92 Id. at 118.
93 The nexus test is not uniformly used or applied in all jurisdictions. Even when it
is applied, there are often a lot of variations in its applications due to the nature of
family courts. When considering the parent’s sexuality in a custody determination,
the nexus test requires that there is a relationship or connection between a parent’s
sexual conduct, homosexual or heterosexual, and the harm to the child. Delong v.
Delong, 1998 WL 15536, at *11 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan 20, 1998); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d
1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 284–85
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
94 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (1998).
95 Id. at 1194.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1196.
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sexual marriage is presented as the moral and societal norm.”99
As demonstrated in all of these cases, judges have wide lati-
tude to enforce custody orders based on myths about homosexuals
as parents and gender bias.100 Charlotte Patterson, a psychologist
specializing in childhood development in the context of family,
writes that “[o]ne issue underlying . . . judicial decision making in
custody litigation . . . has been questions concerning the fitness of
lesbians and gay men to be parents.”101 Patterson identifies four
major categories of fear about the effects of lesbian or gay parents
on children reflected in judicial decision-making about child cus-
tody and in public policies:  1) disturbances in sexual identity; 2)
psychological health; 3) difficulty in social relationships; and 4)
heightened risk of sexual abuse.102 In sum, for gay and lesbian par-
ents, sexuality takes center stage above all other factors, including
their parenting abilities. They are considered risks for no reason
other than being perceived as overtly sexual and promiscuous, re-
gardless of what type of parent they may actually be.
III. THE ROLE MODEL ARGUMENT
An argument against awarding custody to homosexual parents
based on notions of gender and sexuality is that children will not
develop well without normative gender103 and sexual role mod-
els.104 This role model argument is often based on psychological
and sociological theories105 asserting that children benefit from
and deserve a role model of each gender in order to develop prop-
erly.106 Courts have applied the role model argument to both het-
erosexual and homosexual families. For example, a judge can
99 Id. at 1195.
100 See generally WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(2) (West 2011); ALA. CODE § 30-3-1
(1998).
101 Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 5, 1025,
1029 (1992).
102 Id.
103 Harris v. Harris, 647 A.2d 309, 312, 314 (Vt. 1994) (upholding the trial court’s
determination that, though ostensibly not based on gender bias, the boy should re-
main in the custody of this father because they enjoy hunting, fishing and playing
softball together and his father could teach him “things a young boy should know”).
104 In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (finding persuasive
psychologist’s testimony that “the total environment to which the father exposed the
children could impede healthy sexual development in the future . . . the father’s
milieu could engender homosexual fantasies causing confusion and anxiety which
would in turn affect the children’s sexual development . . . it is possible that these
children upon reaching puberty would be subject to either overt or covert homosex-
ual seduction which would detrimentally influence their sexual development.”).
105 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1027–28.
106 See In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 96.
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apply the role model argument in custody disputes involving a ho-
mosexual parent when the judge determines that the children
need to learn about both gender and sexuality from heterosexual
parents as role models.107 Additionally, the role model argument
can be used to award custody between two heterosexual parents by
matching the child’s gender to the parent’s gender, such as the
father-daughter hair braiding example mentioned in the Introduc-
tion.108 In applying the role model argument between two hetero-
sexual parents in a custody dispute, one court awarded custody of
the daughter to the mother, and custody of the son to the father
because “the health and sex of Corey favored Ricky, considering
the need for a strong father figure to act as a role model, but the
health and sex of Rikkita favored Sandra, considering the need for
her mother’s guidance and advice.”109 One court explicitly justified
considering the parents’ sex during custody disputes by writing,
[t]he problem is that man and woman were not created alike or
even equal in all respects, and all the laws and constitutional
amendments in the world cannot change that fact. Can you re-
ally say to a trial judge who decides custody of a baby who is
being breast-fed that he should not consider the sex of the
parents?110
107 S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (expressing concern that the child
“may have difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the
future.”).
108 Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W. 2d 685, 691 (N.D. 1994). See also Harris, 647 A.2d at
314.
109 Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) citing Moore v.
Moore, 183 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1971) (holding that custody of the girls is awarded to
the mother because the mother is universally recognized as the natural guardian and
custodian of her children and is a fit and proper person); Wallace v. Wallace, 420 So.
2d 1326, 1328 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding trial court’s decision to award custody
of boy to father, and custody of girl to mother); Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133 (Md.
1998) (holding that the trial court’s gender-based classification violated state constitu-
tion). The Court of Appeals of Maryland remanded the custody case back to the trial
court after it reviewed the lower court’s unambiguous record that custody of the
daughter should go to the mother because the daughter needed a “female hand.” Id.
at 155. In the dissenting opinion, Judge McAuliffe explained that he does not agree
with the appellate court’s decision arguing that the trial court’s references to gender
was relevant to the custody determination: “I do not understand the majority to hold
that consideration of gender is always inappropriate in a custody case. . . . Judges
should be precluded from concluding that a special relationship, bonding, or ability
to communicate between a parent and a child exists solely on the basis that the parent
and child are of the same sex; judges should not be precluded from finding the exis-
tence of such a relationship from the facts of the case, even though that relationship
may have resulted in part from the reality that the parent and child are of the same
sex.” Id. at 156–7 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
110 Gay v. Gay, 737 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App. 1987).
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As such, this court applied the role model argument based on its
own unverified assumptions that men and women are not equals.
One court, employing the role model argument, presumed
that parents’ gender largely defines the home environment that
they provide their children.111 For example, a state appellate court
in Louisiana wrote that the “difference between the [mother’s
home and the father’s home] is psychologically based. As the child
is approaching puberty, both experts testified that it would be
more beneficial to the child to be with a same-sex parent during
the difficult puberty transitional years.”112 In other words, the Loui-
siana court linked gender with certain pubescent psychological
needs, which it determined could only be found in the home of a
same-sex parent.
In some instances, courts have considered expert testimony
from child psychologists who base their custody recommendations
solely on parents’ gender, even without having interviewed both
parents.113 As a witness, one psychologist stated that, “if both par-
ents are equally capable of parenting, if both parents love the
child, the boy is still better off with the father.”114 In a report en-
tered into evidence, the same psychologist wrote:
[The father] is an excellent model for sex appropriate develop-
ment. . . . If the assumption could be made that the mother is
equally capable of parenting [the child], the data obtained in
the area of child development become relevant in helping to
made [sic] a decision in this case. This child is more likely to
experience normal healthy development if placed in the pri-
mary custody of his father.115
Despite its application to both same-sex and different-sex families,
the role model argument is particularly damaging—and unconsti-
tutional—for same-sex families because it often conflates gender
roles and sexuality. In fact, it relies even more heavily on harmful
stereotypes of gender and sexuality. According to one scholar,
[a]lthough judicial fears of ‘inherent’ damage to the child, such
111 Krotoski v. Krotoski, 454 So. 2d 374, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
112 Id.
113 Weber v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 725 (N.D. 1994); Giffin, 351 Md. at 142-144
(hearing expert testimony at trial that psychologically, daughters need to bond with
their mothers, and that it is not uncommon for children to communicate more effec-
tively with their same-sex parent); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 765 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (considering a clinical psychologist’s testimony that seeing two adult women
being affectionate together would be a “destructively emotional event” for a child who
believed that only males and females are supposed to be intimate with each other).
114 Weber, 512 N.W.2d at 725.
115 Id.
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as impairment of emotional or moral development, are faced by
many parents because of . . . sexual behavior, the homosexual
parent is met with judicial concerns that the child will be gay . . .
or that the parent will be a poor role model.116
When explicitly making the role model argument, opponents of
gay parenting articulate a number of concerns over how parents’
sexuality will potentially (negatively) influence their children’s sex-
ual and gender development. For example, some of the fears that
underlie the role model argument include: “the fear that the sons
of lesbians and gay men will be less masculine and more feminine
than the sons of heterosexual parents and that the daughters of
lesbian and gay men will be less feminine and more masculine than
the daughters of heterosexual parents”;117 the “argument that male
children can best learn from their male parents what it means to
be a complete man and a good father and that female children can
best learn from their mothers what it means to be a complete wo-
man and a good mother”;118 and “the idea that men as fathers and
women as mothers have unique and complementary skills and at-
tributes that are absent whenever a woman tries to father a child
and a man tries to mother a child.”119 Thus, the role model argu-
ment is often used to address the court’s concern that same-sex
parenting will negatively affect the child’s sexual and gender
development.
Lynn Wardle is a major proponent of the belief that gay par-
ents will negatively influence their children’s sexual and gender
development. In fact, his writing is often cited by those making ar-
guments against gay and lesbian parenthood. In his writings, War-
dle emphasizes that parents are important as role models for their
children of the same gender because
[c]hildren learn to be adults by watching adults. Children are
generally more compliant with the parent of the same sex. The
importance of the opposite-gendered parent for the complete
emotional and social development of the child is now recog-
nized as well: Boys and girls build their notions of their sex roles
from experience with both sexes. The loss of cross-gender
parenting may have severe emotional consequences for the
116 Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REV. 405,
448 (1988).
117 Carlos Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of
Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 717 (2003).
118 Id. at 716 (citing Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 854 (1997)). See also Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential
Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 861-62 (1997).
119 Ball, supra note 117, at 710.
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child. For example, the absence of a father in the home may
result in a daughter having trouble relating to men throughout
her adult life. Indirectly, it is also best for children to be raised
by both a father and a mother because men mature and become
most responsible and relate better to children when they have
raised children. This is true in part because the transition from
adult male to father is a much more complex task than some
imagine.120
The Supreme Court of Alabama, quoting Wardle, noted that “the
record contains evidence from which the trial court could have
concluded that ‘[a] child raised by two women or two men is de-
prived of extremely valuable developmental experience and the
opportunity for optimal individual growth and interpersonal devel-
opment.”121 The Court focused on a doctor’s testimony that “a
child is best served by having both a male and female role model in
the house, rather than two male, or two female, role models.”122
Courts have generally accepted sociological and psychological
theories that assume children need male and female role models,
which same-sex families cannot provide.123 “Theories of psychologi-
cal development have traditionally emphasized distinctive contri-
butions of both mothers and fathers to the healthy personal and
social development of their children. As a result, many theories
predict negative outcomes for children who are raised in environ-
ments that do not provide these two kinds of inputs.”124 These so-
cial learning theories are concerned about the possibility that a
child with lesbian or gay parents will not develop according to
norms for his or her own sex, or will be without a same-gender role
model entirely.125 This is a typical argument used against gay and
lesbian parents seeking custody of their children.
The prominence of a parent’s homosexual relationships in
custody decisions often seems to reflect judges’ personal prejudice
against homosexuality as much as their fear of wayward childhood
development. In Cook v. Cook, the “crux of the case,” according to
the judge, was the mother’s lesbian relationship with a woman
120 Wardle, supra note 118, at 860–61.
121 Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (Wardle, supra note 118, at
860–61).
122 Id. at 1193.
123 See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d
at 1196; Weber v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 725 (N.D. 1994).
124 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1027–28.
125 Carlos A. Ball, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian
Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 305 (1998).
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named Shannon.126 At trial, when drafting the joint custody agree-
ment, the court inserted a “Shannon Clause,” which read,
“[n]either parent shall allow Shannon Maloney to be associated
with the minor children and thereby not allowing her to live or
visit in the home at 2961 Highway 4, Ringgold, Louisiana.”127
Though the court apparently found that Shannon’s “athletic . . .
build” was relevant, it did not include any description of any of the
other parents’ physicality.128 A mental health counselor, who testi-
fied on the merits of the ‘Shannon Clause,’ “warned that the chil-
dren would suffer greatly if brought up in a homosexual
environment. This view was informed by his belief that a lesbian
partner would distort the children’s (especially the girls’) percep-
tion of female role models.”129
In some cases, the sexual activity of both parents can be an
issue in custody disputes.130 One mother made allegations that the
father “is involved in adulterous relationships with women to which
the minor child is subjected,” while the father alleged that “[t]he
mother has been and plans to continue to live in a lesbian relation-
ship.”131 After a “careful consideration,” which included noting
that the father admitted to “adultery and/or fornicating with vari-
ous women,” and using illegal drugs, and warning that the court
did not “condone his actions,” the court considered the impact the
father’s behavior might have on his three year-old daughter:132
As yet, this conduct does not seem to have affected Cynthia. In-
deed, nothing in the record indicates that she is even aware that
such conduct occurs. The father has taken care to insure that
the child remains unaware of both the illegal drug use and the
adultery. Thus far, he has been successful.133
Here, the court gave the father the benefit of the doubt by assum-
ing that he would be able to “successfully” carry on his “fornicat-
ing” without his daughter noticing and made no mention of his
sexual activity possibly affecting his daughter. The lesbian mother,
however, did not receive a similar vote of confidence. The court
concluded that the mother’s sexuality per se would indeed harm
her daughter as she approaches “young womanhood”:
126 Cook v. Cook, 965 So. 2d 630, 632 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 633.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Bennett v. O’Rourke, 1985 WL 3464, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5,
1985); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321, 322 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
131 Bennett, 1985 WL 3464, at *1.
132 Id. at *2.
133 Id.
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Admittedly, Cynthia has been examined and found to be nor-
mal, well adjusted, and unaffected as yet by the fact that her
mother is a lesbian. However . . . ‘[t]he Court does not need to
wait, though, till the damage is done. If the child’s situation is
such that damage is likely to occur as her sexual awareness de-
velops with the approach of young womanhood, the court may
in a proper case remove her from the unwholesome environ-
ment.’ In light of the fact that here the homosexual parent and
the minor child are both female, we consider this factor particu-
larly important because of the increased chance of role-
modeling.134
In response to such cases that remove children from the custody of
their homosexual parents,135 gay and lesbian scholars have down-
played the correlation between the sexual orientation of the parent
and the development of their children. As a defensive posture
against attacks from lawyers and judges who believe that homosex-
uality negatively impacts children, some scholars assert that there is
simply no correlation between a parent’s sexuality and their chil-
dren’s development.136 As Judith Stacey and Timothy J. Biblarz
note, “[b]ecause anti-gay scholars seek evidence of harm, sympa-
thetic researchers defensively stress its absence.”137 They found that
[t]his body of research, almost uniformly, reports findings of no
notable differences between children reared by heterosexual
parents and those reared by lesbian and gay parents, and that it
finds lesbian and gay parents to be as competent and effective as
heterosexual parents. Lawyers and activists struggling to defend
child custody and adoption petitions by lesbians and gay men
. . . have drawn on this research with considerable success. Al-
though progress is uneven, this strategy has promoted a gradual
liberalizing trend in judicial and policy decisions.138
However, other research has shown a connection between sexual
orientation and child development.139 Some lesbian and gay schol-
ars and legal theorists strive to use such a connection as an argu-
134 Id. at *3 (quoting L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
135 See Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (noting Wardle’s research that chil-
dren need two heterosexual parents for proper development).
136 Patricia J. Falk, The Gap Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical Research in
Lesbian-Mother Child Custody Cases, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHIL-
DREN’S DEVELOPMENT, 131–56 (Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds.,
1994).
137 Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter? 66 AM. SOC. REV. 160 (2001).
138 Id. at 160.
139 See Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and
Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GEND. & SOC’Y. 11 (2000).
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ment in favor of awarding lesbian and gay parents custody. Judith
Stacey has written that some sociological data “implies that lesbian
parenting may free daughters and sons from a broad but uneven
range of traditional gender prescriptions. It also suggests that the
sexual orientation of mothers interacts with the gender of children
in complex ways.”140 Stacey believes that lesbian and gay family ad-
vocates should explore these differences but must not trivialize gay
and lesbian parents’ fear of losing their parental rights.141 Stacey
does not believe, however, that such “social science research pro-
vides . . . grounds for taking sexual orientation into account in the
political distribution of family rights and responsibilities.”142
If such data is to be used by homosexual parenting advocates,
then it is also important to examine the interplay between the con-
cepts of sexuality and gender used by courts. Often times the no-
tions of gender and sexuality are unintentionally co-mingled or
arbitrarily separated.143 This is again, due in large part to the wide
amount of discretion afforded family court judges, and a result of
each judge relying on their own personal knowledge of, or educa-
tion about, gender and sexuality. Whatever the cause, when judges
conflate sexuality and gender in a custody determination, the re-
sult is often debilitating to the custody claims of gay and lesbian
parents in particular.144
As Clifford Rosky notes,”[f]or opponents of gay and lesbian
parenthood, concerns about gender development are rarely ex-
pressed by themselves, and they are often expressed as synonyms or
euphemisms for concerns about sexual development.”145 Argu-
140 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 137, at 168–170.
141 Id. at 170. Researchers who are sympathetic to the right of gays and lesbians to
become parents stress the absence of any connection between the parents’ sexuality
and any negative impact on their children. Because they are defending the parental
rights of gays and lesbians against attacks from anti-gay scholars, their research only
focuses on the absence of any negative connections, rather than focusing on the pres-
ence of positive outcomes for children of gay and lesbian parents.
142 Id. at 179.
143 Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30,
1998) (Tomlin, P.J., concurring) (“While we are dealing with lesbianism, there is no
ground for a gender-based distinction. Therefore, I shall speak to this issue solely in
terms of homosexuality. Homosexuality has been considered contrary to the morality
of man for well over two thousand years.”).
144 Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (using an
inquiry about a display of the male gender at a gay pride parade as a substitute for
making inquiries about sexuality, when judge asked the Respondent mother about
the masculinity of the participants in a gay pride parade). See also Valdes, supra note
16, at 20 (discussing how the conflation of sex and gender affects the entire legal
system).
145 Rosky, supra note 17, at 345.
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ments about improper gender role-modeling are often veiled anxi-
eties about children not learning the appropriate gender role,
which in turn might affect, or even harm, their sexual develop-
ment, because they might become gay. In Pleasant v. Pleasant, the
court found that a ten-year-old child whose lesbian mother
brought him to a gay pride parade had a “gender identity prob-
lem.” The judge, concerned about the level of masculinity exhib-
ited by men at the parade, asked if there were “men who [were]
not masculine in the parade,” in order to make the custody deter-
mination.146 Other times, courts’ concern over the sexual identity
of the child is more explicit. Such fears were articulated by one
psychological expert who testified that a four-year-old boy should
live with parents in “a normal relationship wherein males and fe-
males adhere to their roles,” because “homosexuality is a learned
trait and it would be very difficult for [the child] to learn and ap-
proximate sex role identification from a homosexual environ-
ment.”147 Whether courts state it explicitly or implicitly, the role
model argument is often used in cases where the judge, not the
parent, is concerned that the child will become a homosexual or
develop gender identity problems.
Clifford Rosky, in Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality,
Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, explores the intersection
of gender and sexuality in child custody cases by analyzing the gen-
der of homophobia expressed by litigants, experts, and judges.
Rosky accomplishes this “[b]y conducting a comparative analysis of
reported family law opinions, showing that gay and lesbian parents
are subjected to gender-influenced stereotypes in custody and visi-
tation cases—stereotypes that are influenced by the parent’s gen-
der, the child’s gender, and the judge’s gender.”148 Instead of
“lump[ing]” together gay fathers and lesbian mothers, or sons and
daughters, Rosky pulls apart each unique relationship and com-
pares cases.149
Rosky’s research uncovered a pattern whereby even though
judges apply the role model argument equally to lesbian moms and
gay dads, there is an unequal application to sons and daughters.150
Rosky identifies that family courts express concern over gay parents
raising sons, more often than daughters, when deciding custody
146 Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637, 639.
147 Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
148 Rosky, supra note 17, at 260.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 297.
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and visitation disputes.151 Rosky posits that one explanation for
more concern over the role modeling and sexual development of
sons can be attributed to theories about sexual development that
assumes children’s relationships with their gay parents will affect
their sexuality. He notes that, “conventional assumptions about the
process of sexual development [are] that before puberty, children
have both homosexual and heterosexual tendencies, and that dur-
ing puberty, they develop sexual relationships based on models
provided by adults, especially parents.”152
Rosky refines his point by comparing old and new theories of
childhood sexual development.153 The old theory considers homo-
sexuality to be a mental disorder and attributes its development in
boys to domineering mothers.154 The new theory has traded homo-
sexuality for “Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood” (GIDC).155
The new theory is more specifically focused on the gender develop-
ment of boys. The theorists still blames “over-involv[ed]” or “over-
protective[ ]” mothers for their sons’ effeminacy. Most
importantly, the theory finds that gender identity disorders are
“precursor[s] to homosexuality in adulthood” mostly for boys.156
Rosky theorizes that such a disproportionate focus on homosexual
parents, as gay role models to sons that may become gay, reveals
the gendered homophobia of judges, experts and litigants who are
more fearful of male homosexuality than female homosexuality.157
Rosky’s hypothesis leads one to speculate what, if any, interest
the state has in monitoring the gender and sexuality development
of children. Rosky suggests that such a gendered and heterosexist
application of the role model argument belies the state’s true inter-
est in promoting the “fantasy” that gay and lesbian children do not,
or should not, exist, and if they do, then they do not matter or
should cease to exist.158
151 Id.
152 Id. at 295.
153 Id. at 301 (citing Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay: The War
on Effeminate Boys, in TENDENCIES 154 (1993)).
154 Rosky, supra note 17, at 301–02.
155 Id. at 303.
156 Id. at 303–04 (citing Kenneth J. Zucker & Robert L. Spitzer, Was the Gender Iden-
tity Disorder of Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into DSM-III as a Backdoor Maneuver to Re-
place Homosexuality? A Historical Note, 31 J. SEX  & MARITAL THERAPY 31, 32 (2005); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-
IV-TR, at 576–82 (4th ed., text rev., 2000)).
157 Id. at 349.
158 Id. at 347.
2011] CAN YOU REALLY BE A GOOD ROLE MODEL? 379
IV. THE ROLE MODEL ARGUMENT AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Whether or not the state’s true interest is actually to ignore or
discourage the presence of gay children, the state does have an
interest in protecting the welfare of children and families.159 Ac-
cording to the best interest of the child doctrine, the court’s role is
to determine which parent will have custody of their child in a way
that benefits the child, without unconstitutionally infringing upon
their protected familial rights.160
In the past, advocates have employed a number of arguments
to challenge the constitutionality of custody determinations focus-
ing on parents’ and children’s rights to equality and liberty.161 To
do so, proponents of gay parents’ rights have made challenges
based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Palmore v. Sidoti, United
States v. Virginia, and Romer v. Evans.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v. Sidoti demon-
strates the unconstitutionality of certain custody factors, by holding
that race cannot be used as a factor in custody determinations.162
At issue in Palmore was whether a white mother, married to a black
man, could retain custody of her white daughter. The Court held
that it is not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution for courts to consider private biases (such as racism),
or the effects of the private bias upon the child, when making cus-
tody determinations.163 The Palmore case offers a helpful defense
159 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (“We reaffirm the rule
that the polestar consideration in child custody cases is the best interest and welfare
of the child.”).
160 See generally In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974). The Court
first acknowledged parents’ rights to visitation with and custody of their children.
However, the court opined that the court may trump these rights if doing so would
protect the best interest of their child. Parental “rights will fall in the face of evidence
that their exercise will result in emotional or physical harm to a child or will be detri-
mental to the child’s welfare . . .” Id. at 95.
161 See generally id. The Court concludes that all parents, hetero- and homosexual
alike, have constitutionally protected fundamental rights to their children, rights that
may not be restricted on the basis of sexual orientation. The court holds that “[t]he
right of a parent, including a homosexual parent, to the companionship and care of
his or her child, insofar as it is for the best interest of the child is a fundamental right
protected by the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. That right may not be restricted without a showing that the parent’s activi-
ties may tend to impair the emotional or physical health of the child.” Id. at 92. Wald,
supra note 4, at 391.
162 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
163 Id. at 433. The Court concluded that it is impermissible to allow private biases
and consider speculative injuries when determining custody. The Court raised the
issue as “whether the reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict are
not permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from custody of its natu-
ral mother . . . . The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
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against opponents who argue that children of gay parents will grow
up to be stigmatized or harassed.164 Palmore held that even if harass-
ment can be shown to exist, the harassment is nevertheless a pri-
vate bias of homophobic or heterosexist people, and as such, it is
not a factor that can be constitutionally considered in a custody
case.165
Carlos Ball discusses the strength of a constitutional challenge
to bans on gay adoption based on United States v. Virginia, an argu-
ment that is analogous to an argument against bans on gay and
lesbian custody.166 Ball contends that because the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Virginia that laws based on overbroad gender
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, laws prohibiting
gays and lesbians from adopting are unconstitutional because they
cannot withstand heightened scrutiny.167 Citing United States v. Vir-
ginia, Ball writes,
[i]t is constitutionally impermissible for the state to be in the
business of promoting the perpetuation of traditional gender
roles from one generation to the next. The idea that women (in
this case mothers) are better able to provide children with cer-
tain benefits and that men (in this case fathers) are better able
to provide distinct benefits is exactly the kind of impermissible
reliance on traditional gender stereotypes that the Supreme
Court, in other contexts, has rejected.168
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Id.
164 Katharine T. Bartlett identifies an issue of gender underlying the issue of race in
Palmore, which received no attention from the Supreme Court except to note that the
white mother began living with her African-American boyfriend before they were mar-
ried. On this subject, the Court wrote that the mother’s “ ‘see[ing] fit to bring a man
into her home and carry[ing] on a sexual relationship with him without being mar-
ried to him’ showed that she ‘tended to place gratification for her own desires ahead
of her concern for the child’s future welfare.’” Bartlett hypothesizes this judgment as
an example of how courts discriminate against women by “penalizing” mothers who
cohabitate outside of marriage more severely than fathers are penalized for similar
living arrangements. Katharine T. Bartlett, Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination in
Custody Cases, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 877, 881 (2000) (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431).
165 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 429.
166 Ball, supra note 117, at 731, citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(“It is easy to foresee a state’s possible response to the use of sex discrimination argu-
ments as a way of challenging a ban on adoption by lesbian and gay couples. The first
likely response would be that the ban is not sex discrimination because . . . [t]here is
. . . no burden imposed on women that is not imposed on men and vice-versa. The
same kind of argument proved to be unsuccessful in Loving v. Virginia.”)
167 Ball, supra note 117, at 732 (“[I]t is . . . interesting to explore whether, assuming
a court were to apply heightened scrutiny, the state’s interest in having children
raised by a man and a woman in order to provide children with appropriate gender
role modeling could survive that form of scrutiny. I do not believe it could.”).
168 Id.
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Rosky raises a possible defense using Romer v. Evans, where the Su-
preme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not per-
mit state action based solely on “animus” toward gay men and
lesbians.169 “After all, the state’s interest in preventing the develop-
ment of gay and lesbian children amounts to little more than a
desire to minimize the number of gay and lesbian adults in the
world—the pursuit of a fantasy that gay and lesbian people will cease
to exist.”170 Rosky reveals the weakness of this constitutional chal-
lenge arguing it would be “naı¨ve” to rely on Romer alone to protect
the rights of gay and lesbian parents where they would not be sub-
jected to role model stereotyping in custody disputes, given that
there are barely any “constitutional protections historically af-
forded to gay men and lesbians.”171 Despite the lack of historical
precedent afforded to the parental rights of homosexual par-
ents,172 significant groundwork can, and should, be laid in order to
demand constitutional protections for all homosexual families;
such progress can be made by employing arguments based on Law-
rence and Craig.
When judges make gendered role model arguments they rely
on overbroad gender stereotypes,173 which are prohibited by the
1976 Supreme Court case, Craig v. Boren.174 In Craig, the court held
that a law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age
of 21, while allowing sales to females over the age of 18, denied 18-
to 20-year-old males equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.175 To survive constitutional challenge,
169 Rosky, supra note 17, at 347 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
170 Id. at 347 (citing Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in TENDENCIES 154, 161 (1993)).
171 Id. at 348.
172 Id.
173 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). In Craig, the Court discusses cases that
“provide[ ] the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated statutes employing
gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification.” Id. at
198. Specifically, Craig references the term “overbroad” and relies on the Schlesinger
decision, which states in part,
[i]n both Reed and Frontiero the challenged classifications based on sex
were premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated
under the Constitution. In Reed, the assumption underlying the Idaho
statute was that men would generally be better estate administrators
than women. In Frontiero, the assumption underlying the Federal Armed
Services benefit statutes was that female spouses of servicemen would
normally be dependent upon their husbands, while male spouses of ser-
vicewomen would not.
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975).
174 Craig, 429 U.S. at 210.
175 Id. at 210 (“We conclude that the gender-based differential contained in Okla.
Stat., Tit. 37, § 245 (1976 Supp.) constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to males aged 18–20 and reverse the judgment of the District Court.”).
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the Court ruled that gender classifications must withstand interme-
diate scrutiny: they “must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives.”176 In Craig, the court said that even though traffic safety is an
important government interest, gender discrimination was not sub-
stantially related to that objective.177 By making sex a suspect classi-
fication under the Equal Protection clause, requiring intermediate
scrutiny, the court provided greater protections to individuals
harmed by sex-based discrimination. In summary, after Craig, the
state may not inculcate traditional gender roles for either men or
women, unless the sex or gender classification can pass intermedi-
ate scrutiny.178
When judges make custody determinations based on
gendered role model arguments, they rely on unconstitutional ste-
reotypes of gender in violation of Craig.179 The most blatant viola-
tion of Craig occurs when courts apply a best interest of the child
standard that explicitly lists “the sex of the child” among the fac-
tors to be considered such as health and age of the child.180 In
Sandlin v. Sandlin, the court based its custody decision, in part, on
the belief that the daughter, because of her sex, needed her
mothers “guidance and advice.”181 With no further explanation
176 Id. at 197 (holding that gender-based classifications must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives and that evidence of differences between drunken driving incidents be-
tween male and females is insufficient to support the gender-based classification con-
tained in the statute in question).
177 Id. at 199–200. The Court noted the presence of an important government in-
terest where “[c]learly, the protection of public health and safety represents an im-
portant function of state and local governments.” Id. However, the Court ultimately
held that gender discrimination was unconstitutional because “appellees’ statistics in
[the Court’s] view cannot support the conclusion that the gender-based distinction
closely serves to achieve that objective and therefore the distinction cannot under
Reed withstand equal protection challenge.”
178 Id. at 210.
179 Id.
180 See, e.g., Hagen v. Hagen, 226 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 1975) (noting that the court
gives serious consideration to a parent’s moral misconduct in addition to other fac-
tors, including, but not limited to, the child’s age and sex and the child’s current
home environment and the petitioner’s home environment); Albright v. Albright,
437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (“We reaffirm the rule that the polestar considera-
tion in child custody cases is the best interest and welfare of the child. . . . Age should
carry no greater weight than other factors to be considered, such as: health, and sex
of the child”).
181 Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the
male subject child required a strong father figure to act as a role model and the
female subject child required her mother, considering her need for her mother’s
“guidance and advice”).
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from the court as to what kind of “guidance” and “advice” the
daughter required, it is clear the decision was based on a stereo-
type of women and girls, and especially mothers and daughters, as
close, intensely communicative “friends.” Gendered role model
“arguments are based on a notion that there are two distinct
sexes—indeed, biologically distinct—each with different skills to
be learned, manners (and mannerisms) to be absorbed, habits to
be ingrained, desires to be reinforced.”182 Furthermore, opponents
of gay parenting “use gender as a proxy” for parenting, believing
that a family comprised of both a male and a female parent, will
provide specific, gendered benefits to their offspring.183
This raises serious doubts as to how the court is equipped to
know whether mothers and fathers provide benefits to their own
same-sex offspring. It is highly unlikely that judges are aware of
some ideal concept of male and female children and can identify
the necessary missing ingredient that one parent can provide bet-
ter than the other, on account of their sex or gender. It is more
likely that, rather than secret knowledge, courts fall back on gener-
alized stereotypes based on their own experiences or education.184
In In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, the Appellate Court noted that the
trial judge expressed “strong antipathy to homosexual living ar-
rangements” and concerns that the child “should be led in the way
of the heterosexual preference.”185 Some judges, due to the wide
latitude to make custody determinations, display their heterosexist
bias by making unnecessary references to parents’ sexuality where
182 Bartlett, supra note 164, at 890. See also Weber v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 725–27
(N.D. 1994) (determining that the trial court award of custody of son to father was
not clearly erroneous, even though based in part on testimony by expert, who had not
met with the mother, that boys are better off with their fathers).
183 Ball, supra note 117, at 718. See also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska
1985) (discussing whether a lesbian mother would increase the likelihood that her
son would also become a homosexual).
184 See, e.g., N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that
judges possess “wide latitude” when making custody decisions as to the best interest of
the child); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983); In re Mar-
riage of Balashov, No. 62378-8-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 185 (Wash. Feb. 1, 2010).
Although “[t]he court did not find that Dimitri’s sexual orientation would be harmful
to his relationships with his children[, it still] noted it as a factor that may affect his
relationships in general.” (emphasis added). Id. at 20. The court stated that it “did not
consider Dimitri’s sexual orientation in a negative light but simply as one of several
changes to which the children were going to have to adjust, a process the court in-
tended to facilitate by allowing them to remain in familiar surroundings for [only
one] year.” Id. at 21. The court ordered that the homosexual father have custody of
his children for one year because it was in the best interest of the children to finish
the school year with their respective schools and then ordered that their heterosexual
mother retain legal custody of the children. Id. at 18.
185 In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d at 888.
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it has no bearing on the best interest of the child.186 The Supreme
Court of Washington commented that a trial court judge had no
legal standards for denying the homosexual parent custody when it
made unnecessary references to the father’s homosexuality.187 Al-
though the Supreme Court of Washington recognized that
“[v]isitation rights must be determined with reference to the needs
of the child rather than the sexual preferences of the parent,” trial
courts continue to incorrectly apply gender and sexual orientation
in the best interests of the child standard.188 The lower court failed
to do a true “best interest of the child analysis” when it chose to
rely on such broad and vague assumptions instead of probing fur-
ther into how the child communicated with both of her parents
and on what issues, in order to determine which parent could best
meet those particular needs.189
In addition to the straightforward gender classification that
some judges apply in resolving custody disputes that make sex of
the parent and child an explicit factor in the best interest of the
child analysis,190 there exists another, perhaps more subtle, gender
classification that occurs when judges make custody determina-
tions involving homosexual parents.191 In cases like this, the courts’
decisions are not so explicitly linked to the sex of the parent or
186 See id.
187 Id.
188 Id. (remanded back to trial court to determine whether the homosexual father
should have visitation rights, stating that “[t]he best interests of the child remain
paramount.”).
189 Cf. Ball, supra note 117, at 718 (discussing how family law courts should focus on
parents’ ability to provide children with life’s “basic necessities,” rather than focusing
on the parties’ gender).
190 See N.K.M.v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (affirmed the
lower court’s modification of the original decree because there was a changed circum-
stance: a homosexual woman in the mother’s home); see also Bark v. Bark, 479 So. 2d
42, 43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 906 So. 2d 39, 41 (Miss. Ct. App.
2004).
191 See M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 331 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting that homo-
sexual father is a worthy parent, because “[h]is homosexuality is not flaunted.”). See
also N.K.M., 606 S.W.2d at 185. The Missouri Court of Appeals interpreted the evi-
dence of the trial court through its own lens of normative heterosexist stereotypes
when it described the mother’s lesbian partner, Betty, using negative terms, such as
‘powerful and dominant.’ Id. at 186. Further, it falsely depicted Betty’s relationship
with the child, Julie, as one motivated by Betty’s lecherous desire to indoctrinate the
child into the undesirable lifestyle of lesbianism:
There emerges from the evidence a picture of Betty as a powerful, a
dominant personality. She had befriended Julie and had won her affec-
tion and her loyalty. She had broached the idea of homosexuality to the
child. Allowing that homosexuality is a permissible life style—an “alter-
nate life style”, as it is termed these days—if voluntarily chosen, yet who
would place a child in a milieu where she may be inclined toward it?
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child (as they are in the case where the daughter needed her
mother as a female role model), but are more based on implicit
notions of gender, sexuality and child development.192
According to Rosky, the underlying concern shifts to
gendered role models reflecting a deeper fear that, without a het-
erosexual role model, kids will grow up to mirror their gay parents,
especially a gay parent of the same sex.193 Rosky argues that when
courts link gender identity disorder to sexuality, they are interpret-
ing certain non-conforming gendered behavior as an early indica-
tor of homosexuality, assuming “effeminate” boys will grow up to
be gay men, and “masculine” girls will grow up to be lesbians.194
Such a chain of inferences can be seen when courts compare
the post-divorce relationships of a heterosexual father and lesbian
mother. Courts often do this by relying on a gender stereotype of
the heterosexual step-mother as a nurturer and caretaker and
favoring her over the mother’s new same-sex partner.195 Conjuring
up images of Donna Reed,196 one court wrote,
The trial court also heard evidence indicating that the father is
no longer a single parent, but has now established a happy mar-
riage with a woman who loves the child, assists in her care, and
has demonstrated a commitment to sharing the responsibility of
rearing the child should the father gain custody of her.197
In contrast, the child’s lesbian step-mother (G.S.) is not described
in such loving and devoted fashion. Her relationship with the child
is described matter-of-factly as testimony, instead of being inter-
She may thereby be condemned, in one degree or another, to sexual
disorientation, to social ostracism, contempt and unhappiness.
Id.
192 See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (deciding
that mother’s lesbian relationship will never be considered a “neutral factor” in her
children’s development).
193 Rosky, supra note 17, at 345 n.517.
194 See id. at 343 (citing Valdes, supra note 16, arguing that courts generally conflate
sex, gender, and sexual orientation).
195 See, e.g., Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195 (Ala. 1998). In that case, the court
heard testimony from an expert witness, Dr. Collier, who testified that after reviewing
at least 50 studies on the effect on children of growing up in a homosexual house-
hold, he consistently found that there is no evidence of any harm to the children. Id.
at 1193. Studies revealed “that a homosexual couple with good parenting skills is just
as likely to successfully rear a child as is a heterosexual couple.” Id. at 1195. The court
still awarded custody in favor of the heterosexual father.
196 Donna Reed, an actress who stared in the 1950’s family sitcom, The Donna Reed
Show, came to symbolize the quintessential suburban American wife and mother.
Donna Reed Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/articles/Donna-
Reed-9542105 (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
197 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1195.
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preted by the court as proof of a home where the child’s emotional
and physical needs could be met.198 Despite the fact that “G.S.
shares in the child’s upbringing in the way of a devoted stepmother
and that . . . G.S. regularly attends school functions and meetings
with the mother, accompanies the child on school field trips, and
eats lunch with the child at school twice a month,” the court does
not decide she has demonstrated enough of a commitment to shar-
ing the responsibility of child rearing as the heterosexual step-
mother.199 Because of her sexuality, and despite all the specifics
the court can point to, G.S. is only acting “in the way of a . . .
stepmother.” On the other hand, the heterosexual stepmother, be-
cause of her sexuality, is automatically considered to be the true,
ideal stepmother for the child, enough so that her presence in the
father’s life tips the custody scale in his favor.200
While it is clear that family courts often rely on overbroad gen-
der stereotypes when making custody determinations, the next
question, according to Craig, is whether the government can pass
intermediate scrutiny by demonstrating important governmental
objectives and show a substantially related means tailored to the
important governmental interest. While the government has never
been required to state its objective for using gender classifications
in custody cases, a reasonable assumption would be that the most
obvious objective it has in making such gender classification is the
children’s protection and their well-being. While protecting chil-
dren is recognized as a legitimate government interest,201 gender
classifications for custody cases still would not pass intermediate
scrutiny because the means are not substantially related to the im-
portant objective. There is little evidence in the field of childhood
development indicating that children are harmed when they lack a
role model of the same sex.202 Research does demonstrate, how-
ever, that children are harmed when they are separated from
healthy parents and families.203
Charlotte Patterson, a psychologist specializing in childhood
198 Id. at 1192.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (accepting the need to protect
children as an important government interest, in which the means must be substan-
tially related to that interest).
202 See Falk, supra note 136, at 143–46.
203 See Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: A Search for Real-
istic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 994 (1975) (“Removing a child from his family
may cause serious psychological damage—damage more serious than the harm inter-
vention is supposed to prevent.”). See also Robson, Our Children, supra note 80, at 920
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development in the context of family, has studied the children of
lesbian and gay men in custody disputes and found that, “in the
resolution of custody disputes . . . the legal system in the United
States has frequently operated under strong but unverified assump-
tions about difficulties faced by children of lesbians and gay men,
and there are important questions about the veridicality of such
assumptions.”204 Patterson has researched and empirically tested
these assumptions and concludes that, “There is no evidence to
suggest that psychosocial development among children of gay men
or lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to that among
offspring of heterosexual parents. Despite longstanding legal pre-
sumptions against gay and lesbian parents in many states . . . not a
single study has found children of gay or lesbian parents to be dis-
advantaged in any significant respect relative to children of hetero-
sexual parents.”205
For example, Patterson reviews studies measuring gender
identity and gender role behavior of children of lesbian mothers
compared to that of children of single heterosexual mothers.206
The tests explored the children’s gender identity and gender role
behavior based on stick figure drawings they were asked to make.
Of the few children who drew an opposite sex figure, only three
exhibited gender issues during clinic interviews. Among those
three children, only one child has a lesbian parent.207 Patterson
cites other tests, such as picking a “sex-typed toy” that is consistent
with conventional gender ideas, or identifying vocational choices
within typical limits for conventional sex roles.208 Patterson con-
cludes, from a survey of such studies, that “[r]esults for both chil-
dren of lesbian and heterosexual mothers were closely in accord
with those for the general population, and there were no differ-
(“In fact, much greater harm is caused by judicial decisions that deprive a child of the
care and companionship of his or her parent.”).
204 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1026. Patterson, a child psychiatrist, surveys studies
conducted by social scientists about children of lesbian and gay parents. Her studies
focus on the sex, identity, personal development, and social relationships of children
raised in a homosexual household. Martha Kirkpatrick, Catherine Smith, & Ron Roy,
Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Survey, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
545, 545–551 (1981) (comparing children of lesbian mothers to children of single
heterosexual mothers is relevant to custody cases).
205 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1036.
206 Id. at 1030 (citing Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 204).
207 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 204, at 548.
208 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1030 (citing Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37
Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692–97
(1978)).
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ences between children of lesbian and heterosexual mothers.”209
While the role model argument is based on overbroad gender
stereotypes, gender classification in custody disputes using the role
model argument does not necessarily discriminate based on gen-
der because courts rely equally on stereotypes of men and women
and do not actually favor one gender over the other. While there is
some concern, based on a study of California residents, that the
best interest of the child test makes a discriminatory gender classifi-
cation by preferring mothers to fathers,210 there is less support for
the conclusion that the role model argument (as an element of the
best interest of the child test) discriminates between men and wo-
men. This holds true for the cases when the determining factor is
that children need both male and female role models. However, by
making such a gender classification and determining children
need both male and female role models, courts are discriminating
based on sexuality against same-sex couples who cannot provide
parents of both genders in the same household.211 Katharine T.
Bartlett argued in her article that there is also a concern that fa-
thers suffer gender discrimination in custody cases where judges
favor fathers over mothers.212 “Another set of discrimination claims
concerns the complaint of fathers that the sex-based double stan-
dard works against them, not in their favor.”213
In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
state cannot enforce sexual conformity by prohibiting private sex-
ual activity between consenting adults of the same sex.214 At issue
in Lawrence was a Texas statute that prohibited “deviate sexual in-
tercourse” that was applied to sexual activity between same sex
couples.215 The Court held the statute unconstitutional and reaf-
firmed the constitutional protection for privacy, applying that pri-
vacy right to consensual homosexual activity.216 Lawrence is a
209 Patterson, supra note 101, at 1030.
210 Bartlett, supra note 164, at 886. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY AND ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 99–103
(1992) (identifying disproportional results where women obtain custody in 80% to
90% of cases in California).
211 In re Marriage of Dorworth, 33 P.3d 1260 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing trial
court modification application where mother sought to restrict father’s visitation
rights to visit their daughter because his sexuality would confuse the child, who was
raised to believe a family consisted of only a mother, a father, and a child).
212 Bartlett, supra note 164.
213 MACCOBY AND MNOOKIN, supra note 210, at 99–103.
214 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
215 Id. at 563.
216 Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
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landmark decision because it recognizes a liberty interest in pri-
vate, consensual, homosexual conduct.217
Lawrence is a powerful tool with which to attack state discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians because it is the closest the Su-
preme Court has come to recognizing the equal right of
homosexuals under the Constitution.218 It does so, however, with-
out labeling the liberty interest as a fundamental right, which
would require strict scrutiny.219 This leaves the standard of scrutiny
to be applied open for debate, and allows states room to prefer or
prohibit different forms of sexual orientation.220 Despite the lack
of strict scrutiny, however, Lawrence can still be applied to family
law, with implications for how courts use role model arguments
when making custody determinations for same-sex parents.221
In the context of family law, Lawrence reinforces that privacy is
a constitutionally protected right under the liberty clause of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.222 It analogized the privacy at stake in Lawrence to the
privacy rights recognized in the birth control case, Griswold v. Con-
necticut,223 and the abortion rights cases, Roe v. Wade224 and Planned
Parenthood of Southern Pa. v. Casey,225 from which the concept of
217 Id.
218 See id. In explaining why the Constitutional right to liberty applies equally to all
people, regardless of sexuality, the Court stated “adults may choose to enter upon [a
same-sex] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in inti-
mate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homo-
sexual persons the right to make this choice.” Id. at 567.
219 See id. Justice Scalia expressed his preference for strict textualism when he stated
that “nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘funda-
mental right’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy
were a ‘fundamental right.’” Id. at 586. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 16, at 94.
221 See McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004).
222 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003).
223 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (identifying privacy as a fun-
damental right that protects the use of contraception among married couples, based
on the privacy interest that exists within the institution of marriage and within the
protected space of the marital bedroom).
224 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a women’s right to privacy
within the concept of liberty of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the fundamental right to abortion).
225 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaf-
firming the right to privacy is located within the concept of liberty of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and includes the right
to abortion).
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family privacy stems.226
In all of these privacy cases, including Lawrence, the Court rec-
ognized that the government was infringing on “fundamental per-
sonal interests relating to family.”227 By correlating Griswold, Roe,
and Lawrence, the Court in Lawrence paints a trajectory of Constitu-
tional privacy rights, from Griswold to Lawrence, excluding Bowers228
as a mistakenly decided case that should be overruled.229 Bowers is
excluded from this line of privacy cases230 because it did not iden-
tify consensual homosexual relationships as a privacy right.231 Con-
versely,232 Lawrence makes a strong link from family, marriage, and
procreation to homosexuality.233 “In calling for a more generous
characterization of the liberty interest at stake, the Court analo-
gized directly to the marital privacy right vindicated in Griswold.”234
Thus, the Court acknowledged the connection between the right
to homosexuality and the fundamental rights of privacy and liberty
226 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Lawrence discussed the “broad” definition of liberty in
cases from the early twentieth century, such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v.
Nebraska. These cases are relevant to the Lawrence decision because of how its discus-
sion of liberty ultimately gave rise to the recognition of privacy as a substantive due
process right within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, which occurred in Griswold v. Connecticut.
227 David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 550
(2008).
228 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
229 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
230 Meyer, supra note 227, at 549–50.
231 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–191 (“[A]ccepting the decisions in these [privacy] cases
. . . we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy . . . . No connection between family, marriage, or procreation . . . and homo-
sexual activity . . . has been demonstrated”).
232 Meyer, supra note 227, at 550 (“Whereas Bowers had seen ‘[n]o connection be-
tween family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other,’ Lawrence saw plenty.” (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 )).
233 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67. The Court discussed the connection between the
rights to family and the rights to homosexuality.
The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fun-
damental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence in-
validates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time. That statement, we now con-
clude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67 (internal citations omitted).
234 Meyer, supra note 226, at 550 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567).
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within the Constitution.235
In Lawrence, the Court emphasized that the question was not
the legality of sexual acts, but the protection of private intimacy.236
Justice Kennedy wrote, “the . . . statutes . . . purport to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act . . . . The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to for-
mal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals.”237 Finally and most
significantly for family law, Casey held that, “our laws and traditions
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education,”238 and Lawrence followed by concluding
that, “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy
for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”239
Given the privacy protection extended to homosexuals in Law-
rence, the role model custody standard applied in custody cases in-
trudes upon the privacy rights of same-sex parents to raise their
children and have a family. One court grappled with the implica-
tions of Lawrence when making a custody determination between a
gay father and his heterosexual ex-wife by recognizing that, after
Lawrence, homosexuality was essentially “a protected practice under
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution” and that
“[t]his decision . . . has at least some bearing on the degree to
which homosexuality may play a part in child custody
proceedings.”240
When judges deny custody or visitation to lesbian or gay par-
ents because the parents are not heterosexual and cannot provide
both a “male” and a “female” role model, they are infringing upon
the constitutionally protected privacy rights of lesbian and gay par-
235 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
236 Id. at 567.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 573–74. The Court strengthens the connection between the privacy right
in Casey and the privacy right in Lawrence by quoting the following from Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
239 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
240 McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004).
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ents, in violation of Lawrence. For example, in Ex Parte J.M.F, the
Court stated that its decision was not based solely on the mother’s
sexual conduct, but was instead based on the following:
Rather, it is a custody case based upon two distinct changes in
the circumstances of the parties: (1) the change in the father’s
life, from single parenthood to marriage and the creation of a
two-parent, heterosexual home environment, and (2) the
change in the mother’s homosexual relationship, from a dis-
creet affair to the creation of an openly homosexual home
environment.241
Under Lawrence, the above custody determination is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the mother’s rights because it uses her sexuality
to deny her privacy rights to family and child-rearing.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, the father in Dalin and the mother in Ex Parte J.M.F.,
should not have lost custody of their children because they could
not braid hair or provide a heterosexual step-mother, respectively.
Both parents lost custody in courts that used gender and sexuality
as a stand-in for parenting skills, in violation of their constitutional
rights. However, both cases should serve as incentive for courts to
create a definition of family that evaluates parents less on their sex-
uality and gender and more on their ability to provide for their
children.
When making custody determinations, the state should have
no interest in limiting or guiding the gender and sexuality develop-
ment of children, but should support and encourage safe and
healthy sexuality and gender development for all children and
families. Children and their parents deserve no less than to have
courts protect, rather than attack, their rights to a healthy and se-
cure family.
241 Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998).
